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Exclusions  
and exemptions  
in onshore and 
offshore trusts
FOLLOWING SPREAD V HUTCHESON, GUERNSEY AND JERSEY TRUSTS LAW HAS  
BEEN ALIGNED MORE CLOSELY WITH ENGLISH AND WELSH LAW WITH REGARDS TO  
DUTIES AND STANDARDS OF CARE. HOWEVER, A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE PROVISION IS REQUIRED  
IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN ORDER TO LIMIT EXCLUSIONS AND EXEMPTIONS
By Daniel Clarry
ABSTRACT
• The en bon père de famille obligation in Guernsey 
trusts law has effectively been translated in the 
Spread v Hutcheson litigation, in which it was 
uniformly accepted to be equivalent to the standard 
of care applicable to trustees in England and Wales 
and in Jersey, i.e. the ‘prudent man of business’.  
This removes a latent uncertainty in Guernsey law.
• Despite difficulties in the reasoning of the Privy 
Council in Spread, the alignment of standards of 
care of trustees develops greater cohesion across 
these prominent trust jurisdictions and facilitates  
the coherent development of trusts jurisprudence.
• Unlike in England and Wales, the standards of care 
in Guernsey and Jersey are mandatory, rather than 
applicable by default, which ensures greater 
accountability in offshore trust administration. 
• Guernsey and Jersey have also taken a more robust 
position on trustee exemption clauses, where liability 
for a trustee’s own fraud, wilful default or gross 
negligence cannot be exempted; in England and 
Wales, all liability save actual fraud can be exempted.
• Despite leading trust precedents recommending 
against broadly drafted trustee-exemption clauses, 
and attempting to strike an appropriate balance 
between accountability and protection of trustees, 
trustees may nevertheless insist on lower standards 
of care being imposed, consonant with the general 
and statutory law.
• As a matter of public policy, the minimum  
standards of care that apply to trustees and any 
consequent liability ought to be clearly stated as a 
matter of law, irrespective of trust drafting. Trustees 
would not be unduly exposed as there remain 
internal mechanisms in trusts law that protect 
diligent trustees from liability, including obtaining 
legal advice, concurrence from beneficiaries and 
protection from the court, where necessary.
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This article builds and reflects on an article published in the Jersey & Guernsey Law Review, 1 which was primarily concerned 
with Spread Trustee Co Ltd v Hutcheson.2 In 
Spread, a preliminary question of law made its  
way to the Privy Council: could a trustee be 
exempted from liability for gross negligence in  
a trust instrument before 19 February 1991?3 If a 
trustee could not be so exempted, the provisions  
in the relevant trust instruments were invalid and 
the beneficiaries could pursue their claim against  
the trustee. 
Departing from the Royal Court of Guernsey and 
the Guernsey Court of Appeal judgments, and only 
by a slim majority (3:2), the Privy Council held that 
a trustee could be exempted from liability for gross 
negligence in a trust instrument under Guernsey 
customary law. Essentially, the Privy Council 
aligned the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 1989 with 
Guernsey customary law such that, until 19 
February 1991 when statutory amendment came 
into force, Guernsey customary and statutory  
law both allowed trustee exemption clauses that 
excluded liability for gross negligence. 
There were three problems with that approach. 
First, the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 1989 was not a 
codification of Guernsey trusts law and it should 
not have been treated as such by approaching  
the determination of Guernsey customary law  
as simply a matter of statutory construction.  
Second, the explanatory material that 
accompanied the relevant amendment to the 
Trusts (Guernsey) Law 1989 to explicitly prohibit 
the exemption of liability for gross negligence in a 
trust instrument did not treat that amendment as a 
particularly momentous occasion, even though it 
was the first time that gross negligence could not 
be excluded by the terms of a trust instrument 
under Guernsey law, according to the majority of 
1. Daniel Clarry, ‘The Offshore Trustee en bon père de famille’, Jersey & Guernsey 
Law Review, 5 (2014) 18(1)
2. [2012] 2 AC 194 (Spread (PC))
3. On 19 February 1991, an amendment to the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 1989 came 
into effect that explicitly prohibited the exemption of liability for a trustee’s grossly 
negligent conduct
the Privy Council.4 Third, although the Privy 
Council accepted that the statutory draftsmen in 
Guernsey followed a similar amendment in Jersey,5 
the prohibition on ‘gross negligence’ was also 
introduced in Jersey without any indication that it 
was a significant change to the pre-existing law.6 
One interesting feature of the Spread litigation 
warrants further attention because it resolves a 
peculiar aspect of Guernsey trusts law. In 
determining the position of trustee exemption 
clauses under Guernsey customary law as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, the Privy Council did 
not consider that the unique obligation to act en 
bon père de famille in the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 
1989, which was accepted to be declaratory of 
Guernsey customary law, had any particular role  
to play in the determination of the question of 
whether a trustee of a Guernsey trust could be 
exempted from liability for grossly negligent 
conduct. Instead, the Privy Council equated  
the obligation to act en bon père de famille with  
the standard of care expected of a trustee in  
English and Welsh law. 
The consequence of doing so is that the  
standards of care in onshore and offshore trust 
administration are aligned, even though the law  
on trustee exemption clauses remains quite 
different. The duties of care applicable to trustees 
in England and Wales, Guernsey and Jersey are the 
subject of this article, as well as the law on exclusion 
and exemption clauses and the drafting practice 
that has arisen responsively. It will be shown  
that, while the duties of care are similarly framed  
in onshore and offshore trust administration,  
the mandatory nature of Guernsey and Jersey 
trusts laws ensures that duties of care cannot be 
excluded by the terms of a trust in the Channel 
Islands and trustees cannot be exempted from 
liability for gross negligence. This enhances the 
4. States’ Advisory and Finance Committee, ‘Report on Amendments to the 
Guernsey (Trusts) Law 1989’, 16 March 1990, Billet d’État VIII of 1990, article VI.  
See also Spread Trustee Co Ltd v Hutcheson (2009) 10 GLR 403 (Spread (GCA)), 
35–38, per Martin JA
5. Spread (PC) at 216, per Lord Clarke
6. Finance and Economics Committee, Explanatory Note (lodged with the draft 
Jersey Amendment Law au Greffe), 31 January 1989 
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accountability of offshore trustees, relative to  
their onshore counterparts. 
STANDARDS OF CARE IMPOSED  
ON TRUSTEES
A duty of care is a fundamental aspect of trust 
administration that regulates the manner in which 
a trustee executes the trust and performs their 
duties as trustee. The difficulty in defining the  
duty of care is in shaping an objective standard  
of care to be applied to the different persons that 
may occupy the office of trustee. Nevertheless,  
it is fundamental to ensuring that a trust will  
actually be performed. 
Aside from active or positive breaches of trust 
(i.e. misapplication or misappropriation of trust 
property), trustees commonly commit passive 
breaches of trust by failing to act diligently – in 
particular, by failing to monitor trust investments 
that have not been diversified but simply comprise 
a concentrated shareholding in a particular 
company that declines in value. Three examples 
may be given of such cases. In Re Lucking’s Will 
Trusts,7 a trustee was held liable for failing to 
supervise the management of a company in  
which the trust had a controlling interest. In 
Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No.2),8  
a bank was held liable for failing to supervise  
two land development projects undertaken by a 
company of which the bank held 99.8 per cent of 
7. [1967] 3 All ER 726
8. [1980] Ch 515
the shares as trustee. In Spread, the relevant 
conduct concerned the alleged failure by the 
trustee to monitor shares, the value of which 
plummeted over several years by some  
GBP50 million.9 
Such cases give rise to the common complaint 
that trustees did not take appropriate steps to 
preserve the value of the trust fund and did not  
act diligently. Similarly, trustees who do not 
actively administer the trust may also be held  
liable for failing to monitor the performance  
of the trust by their co-trustees. In such cases,  
the difficulty is in setting the appropriate  
threshold for liability where the trustee has  
not actively breached the trust. For this reason,  
the framing of duties of care to regulate such 
conduct is especially important, albeit difficult  
to define in abstraction, and has given rise to 
shifting standards of care to take account of  
the circumstances. 
England and Wales
In England and Wales, a trustee’s duty of care is 
expressed as, or likened to, that of the ‘ordinary 
prudent man of business’ or, in other words, it is 
the duty to act as a reasonable and prudent man 
would act in the conduct of his own affairs – that is, 
9. In Spread, the claim was met by an exemption clause that successfully relieved  
the trustee from liability except for ‘wilful and individual fraud or wrongdoing…’  
See also Hildyard J, ‘Prudence and Vituperative Epithets’ (lecture given to the  
Chancery Bar Association’s Annual Conference (London, 21 January 2012)), available 
at www.step.org/prudence-and-vituperative-epithets (estimating the loss to the trust 
fund to be some GBP50 million)
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Aside from active or positive breaches of trust, trustees commonly commit 
passive breaches of trust by failing to act diligently – in particular, by failing 
to monitor trust investments that have not been diversified but simply 
comprise a concentrated shareholding in a particular company
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with reasonable care and skill.10 In the general law, 
that formulation allows for a shifting standard 
depending on the care and skill that one would 
expect would be exercised by the trustee in 
question, since the test of what is ‘reasonable’ in 
the circumstances must reflect the qualities of the 
trustee in question.11 
Similarly, in the statutory law, a trustee’s duty  
of care is to ‘exercise such care and skill as is 
reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in 
particular to the following: any special knowledge 
or experience that he has or holds himself out as 
having; and, if he acts as trustee in the course of a 
business or profession, to any special knowledge  
or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a 
person acting in the course of that kind of business 
or profession.’12 Furthermore, the conduct of a 
trustee will be considered by having regard to the 
facts and circumstances known to, or that ought to  
have been known by, the trustee at the time, and 
not with the benefit of hindsight.13 
By virtue of the Trustee Act 2000 (TA 2000), the 
statutory duty of care is attached to a broad range 
of powers of a trustee, however conferred.14 The 
statutory duty of care attaches to powers to:15 
invest and review such investments; acquire land;16 
employ agents, nominees and custodians and 
review the conduct of such persons;17 compound 
liabilities, etc;18 insure trust property;19 and get in 
reversionary interests falling into possession, as 
10. Re Speight; Speight v Gaunt [1883] 22 Ch D 727 per Sir George Jessel MR (CA), 
affd sum nom Speight v Gaunt [1883] 9 App Cas 1; Learoyd v Whiteley [1887] 12 App 
Cas 727 (HL); Re Godfrey [1883] 23 Ch D 483; Re Chapman [1896] 2 Ch 763 (CA);  
Re Lucking’s Will Trusts [1967] 3 All ER 726, [1968] 1 WLR 866; Bartlett v Barclays Bank 
Trust Co Ltd (Nos.1 and 2) [1980] 1 Ch 515, 531 and 534 per Brightman J; Henderson 
v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145; Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew 
[1998] Ch 1. See also Getzler, ‘Duty of Care’, in Birks & Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust 
(2002) 41
11. Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (Nos.1 and 2) [1980] Ch 515, 531–534  
per Brightman J. See also Re Waterman’s Will Trusts [1952] 2 All ER 1054
12. TA 2000, s1
13. Re Hurst [1892] 67 LT 96 (CA), 99 per Lindley LJ; Re Chapman [1896] 2 Ch 763, 
777–78 (CA); Nestle v National Westminster Bank [1994] 1 All ER 118 (CA), 134 per 
Staughton LJ
14. TA 2000, s2 and Schedule 1
15. TA 2000, sections 4 and 5, and Schedule 1, s1
16. TA 2000, s8, and Schedule 1, s2
17. TA 2000, sections 11, 16, 17, 18 and 22, and Schedule 1, s3
18. TA 2000, Schedule 1, s4; Trustee Act 1925 (UK), s15
19. TA 2000, Schedule 1, s5; Trustee Act 1925 (UK), s19
well as ascertaining and fixing the value of trust 
property.20 However, the statutory duty of care 
only applies in the circumstances specified by the 
TA 2000.21 As such, it is important to consider not 
only when the duty of care does apply, but when it 
does not: ‘The duty of care does not apply if or in so 
far as it appears from the trust instrument that the 
duty is not meant to apply.’22 In so providing, the 
TA 2000 makes the statutory duty of care a default, 
rather than mandatory, rule of English and Welsh 
trusts law. It is, therefore, left to settlors, and 
especially those advising them, to choose to 
exclude the statutory duty of care by the terms  
of the trust. 
Despite extensive consultation and statutory 
reform, the TA 2000 failed to grapple with the 
difficult public policy question of setting the limits 
on lawful exclusion of a trustee’s duty of care and 
what base standard must apply. Thus, trust 
instruments will either exclude the statutory duty 
of care altogether, thereby rendering the core 
aspect of the TA 2000 inoperative, or reduce the 
higher standard of care applicable to professional 
trustees down to that of lay trustees.23 This 
manipulation of a trustee’s duty of care means that 
professional trustees often only owe a duty to act 
honestly and in good faith or, put another way,  
not to act dishonestly or fraudulently. 
Despite the vulnerability of beneficiaries to the 
mismanagement of trustees, the rules of English 
and Welsh trusts governance are weak relative  
to those applicable to other fiduciary office-
holders, such as directors and certain trustees, 
where duties of due or reasonable care and skill 
cannot be excluded by the terms of a constitutive 
document.24 The approach taken in the statutory 
law of setting the duty of care merely as a default 
rule permits the perverse result that those who are 
20. TA 2000, Schedule 1, s6; Trustee Act 1925 (UK), s22(1) and (3)
21. TA 2000, s1(1) and (2)
22. TA 2000, Schedule 1, s7
23. Reed and Wilson, The Trustee Act 2000 – A Practical Guide (Jordan Publishing, 
2001), page 154
24. See, for example, Companies Act 2006, s174 (as to directors), s750 (as to 
debenture trustees); Pensions Act 1995, s33 (as to pension trustees); Financial  
Services and Markets Act 2000, s253 (as to unit trustees)
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entitled to charge professional fees for trust 
administration and hold themselves out as having 
certain skills often owe no duty to take any 
reasonable care, or the same standard applicable  
to trustees receiving no remuneration at all.
Guernsey 
In Guernsey, a trustee’s duty of care is reduced to 
the expression that ‘a trustee shall, in the exercise 
of his functions, observe the utmost good faith and 
act en bon père de famille’.25 In terms of what that, 
at least superficially distinctive, language means  
in practical terms, we have authoritative guidance 
from the Privy Council in Spread.26 Indeed, this 
was one of the points that was upheld per curiam 
on appeal at an intermediate and final appellate 
level and is, therefore, an important aspect  
of Spread. 
Martin JA (with whom Vos and Montgomery  
JJA agreed) considered there to be ‘no doubt the 
obligation to act en bon père de famille implies a 
standard of care similar to that required of trustees 
in England, namely that of a prudent man of 
business…’27 On appeal, Lord Clarke (with whom 
Lord Mance and Sir Robin Auld agreed) also 
considered that it is ‘no doubt the duty of  
a trustee under [the relevant provision of the 
Guernsey (Trusts) Law 1989 codifying the en  
25. Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s22(1)
26. Spread (PC) at 213 per Lord Clarke (with whom Lord Mance and Sir  
Robin Auld agreed)
27. Spread (GCA) at 421, citing Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd  
(No.2) [1980] 1 Ch 515
bon père de famille obligation] to act prudently 
and thus to exercise all reasonable care and skill  
to be expected of a trustee.’28 The majority of the 
Board of the Privy Council went on to endorse  
that approach by interpreting the en bon père 
obligation as ‘the duty... to act as a reasonable  
and prudent trustee would act – that is, with 
reasonable care and skill.’29 In his leading  
opinion, Lord Clarke considered that the  
trustee’s duty of care is ‘the same’ in Guernsey  
as it is in England and Wales and also in Scotland.30 
However, the content of the duty of care in 
Guernsey law to act en bon père de famille was not 
the issue that split the Board of the Privy Council. 
Indeed, Lady Hale similarly held that ‘the duty to 
act en bon père de famille [was] clearly equivalent 
to the duty adopted by English law to act as a 
prudent man of business…’31 Rather, the key issue 
was whether the en bon père de famille obligation 
carried with it some particular quality, such that  
a prospective exemption of liability for gross 
negligence in a trust instrument would be  
inimical to a Guernsey trust. 
On that question, no peculiar meaning was given 
to the en bon père obligation, even though the 
dissenting opinions, especially that of Lord Kerr, 
highlighted the obvious difference between the  
two duties, in that the English and Welsh duty of 
care did not embody the concept of fiduciary loyalty, 
whereas the duty to act as a bon père plainly was 
fiduciary in nature.32 Leaving that dissent aside, the 
unique obligation to act en bon père de famille was 
authoritatively translated in Spread and equated 
with English and Welsh trusts law.
Eliding those jurisdictions together on a central 
feature of trust law serves to develop greater 
cohesion and coherency across those different 
jurisdictions, whereas a different approach that 
28. Spread (PC) at 209
29. Spread (PC) at 209, 213
30. Spread (PC) at 209, 218 per Lord Clarke (with whom Lord Mance and Sir Robin 
Auld agreed), citing Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No. 2) [1980] 1 Ch 515 
and Lutea Trustees Ltd v Orbis Trustees Guernsey Ltd (1998) SLT 471, 473 per Lord 
Justice Clerk (Cullen)
31. Spread (PC) at 245
32. Spread (PC) at 255 per Lord Kerr
The majority of the Board of  
the Privy Council interpreted the  
en bon père obligation as ‘the duty...  
to act as a reasonable and prudent  
trustee would act – that is, with 
reasonable care and skill’
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lent weight to the distinctiveness of the obligation 
to act en bon père de famille in Guernsey trust law 
may have isolated Guernsey from the prominent 
trusts jurisdictions upon which it typically draws 
in developing its trusts jurisprudence. Guernsey 
would have been alone in fashioning its trust law 
around the en bon père de famille obligation. 
Although the mixed legal system of Quebec  
has known the trust for a long time, the en bon  
père de famille obligation was not adopted in the 
recodification of the Quebec Civil Code in 1994.33 
France has also recently purged the en bon père de 
famille expression from its general law.34 As such,  
a distinctive interpretation of a Guernsey trustee’s 
obligation to act en bon père de famille would  
have created uncertainty in advising on Guernsey 
trusts and increased the likelihood of litigation to 
resolve those uncertainties. For that reason, even 
though the obligation for a Guernsey trustee to act 
en bon père de famille does look superficially 
distinct, there are good policy reasons behind 
equating that obligation with the prudent man of 
business in English and Welsh trust law. In any 
event, no indication was given in the explanatory 
report that accompanied the passage of the Trusts 
Guernsey Law 1989 as to what was meant by the 
obligation to act en bon père de famille, and little 
appears to have been known in the profession, 
more generally.35 
Jersey 
In contrast with Guernsey, Jersey mirrors the 
English and Welsh trustee’s duty of care much 
more closely in providing that a ‘trustee shall in the 
33. A Popovici, ‘Le bon père de famille’, in Mélanges Adrian Popovici: Les couleurs  
du droit, Générosa Bras Miranda et Benoît Moore, (Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2010), 
page 125
34. J Parienté, ‘Le “bon père de famille” va disparaître du droit français’, Le Monde, 20 
January 2014, available at www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/01/20/le-bon-pere-
de-famille-menace-de-disparition-du-droit-francais_4350949_823448.html
35. States’ Advisory and Finance Committee, ‘Report on the Guernsey (Trusts) 
Law’, 12 February 1988, Billet d’État IX of 1988. No further indication was given as 
to the meaning of the en bon père de famille expression with the amendments to 
the Guernsey (Trusts) Law 1989 in 1990 nor in the re-enactment of that Act in 2007 
– see States’ Advisory and Finance Committee, ‘Report on Amendments to the 
Guernsey (Trusts) Law 1989’, 16 March 1990, Billet d’État VIII of 1990; Commerce 
and Employment Department, ‘Review of Trust Law in Guernsey’, Billet d’État XXI 
(reported 13 December 2006, reviewed 27 October 2006), 2398–413
execution of his or her duties and in the exercise of 
his or her powers and discretions… act… with due 
diligence… as would a prudent person… to the best 
of the trustee’s ability and skill; and observe the  
utmost good faith.’36 
As in England and Wales, shifting standards  
apply in each case, depending on the particular 
circumstances, especially the individual trustee’s 
ability and skill. However, like in Guernsey, and 
unlike in England and Wales, the duty of care  
is not excludable by the terms of a trust instrument 
in Jersey, thereby making it a mandatory rule  
of Jersey trust law and part of the irreducible  
core of a Jersey trust, which cannot be excluded 
when creating such a trust. Jersey has, therefore, 
taken a more robust approach than England  
and Wales in fixing the duty of care in Jersey  
trust administration. 
TRUSTEE EXCLUSION  
AND EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
Trustee exemption clauses are closely connected 
with the trustee’s duty of care because such clauses 
curtail the consequences that would ordinarily 
arise from the breach of the trustee’s duty of care. 
It also follows, therefore, that a distinction must  
be drawn between trustee exemption clauses, 
which purport to exempt a trustee from liability 
arising from a breach of trust, and trustee 
exclusion clauses, which attempt to exclude  
the underlying duty itself. 
That conceptual difference translates, in 
practical terms, into the kinds of remedies that 
might be available to correct a breach of trust.37 
Equitable compensation, for example, is one 
remedy that may be available, but other remedies 
may be more appropriate depending on the 
circumstances of the case. While a trustee 
exemption clause might restrict the personal 
liability of a trustee in terms of paying equitable 
compensation, and thereby provide adequate 
protection for a trustee, other remedies ought to  
36. Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, s21(1)
37. Compare Futter v HMRC; Pitt v HMRC [2013] 2 AC 108, [2013] UKSC 26, 89  
per Lord Walker
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be available to beneficiaries, such as injunctive 
relief and the ancillary liability of third parties.  
Trustee exclusion clauses risk destabilising other 
remedial relief and ought to be avoided, despite  
the possibility of excluding a trustee’s duty of care 
in English and Welsh law. 
Here, we are concerned with the different 
approaches to trustee exemption clauses in 
onshore and offshore trust administration –  
again, a more robust position has been taken  
in the Channel Islands than England and Wales  
on the ability of trustee exemption clauses to 
exempt trustees of liability.
England and Wales
In England and Wales, Armitage v Nurse  
remains the leading authority on the lawful  
scope of trustee exemption clauses. In the  
case, the Court of Appeal upheld a clause 
exempting any trustee ‘for any loss or damage…  
to [the Trust]… unless such loss or damage shall  
be caused by his own actual fraud’.38 There, Millett 
LJ held that ‘actual fraud’ meant dishonesty and 
that, as the clause was not void on the grounds of 
public policy, the trustee would only be liable for 
dishonesty. If the trustee breached the trust, but 
did so with the honest intention of furthering the 
interests of the trust, then the trustee would be 
exempted from personal liability, according to 
Millett LJ. 
That subjective approach to dishonesty has 
subsequently been pared back by the Court  
of Appeal in Walker v Stones, in which Sir 
Christopher Slade rejected the subjective approach 
for dishonesty and preferred a more objective test 
for determining whether an ‘honest belief’ of the 
trustee was ‘reasonable’.39 As such, a trustee 
exemption clause ‘would not exempt the trustees 
from liability for breaches of trust, even if 
committed in the genuine belief that the course 
taken was in the best interests of the beneficiaries, 
if such belief was so unreasonable that no 
38. Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 421
39. Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902, 939 per Sir Christopher Slade
reasonable solicitor-trustee could have held  
that belief.’40 That adds a preferable gloss to  
Millett LJ’s approach. 
As to the possibility of excluding a trustee’s  
duty of care, Millett LJ clearly stated:41 
 ‘I accept the submission made on behalf of [the 
beneficiary] that there is an irreducible core of 
obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries 
and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the 
concept of a trust. If the beneficiaries have no rights 
enforceable against the trustees, there are no trusts. 
But I do not accept the further submission that these 
core obligations include the duties of skill and care, 
prudence and diligence. The duty of the trustees  
to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith for  
the benefit of the beneficiaries is the minimum 
necessary to give substance to the trusts, but in  
my opinion it is sufficient.’
To be absolutely clear, Millett LJ went further  
in stating:42 
 ‘In my judgment [the relevant clause in the trust 
instrument] exempts the trustee from liability for  
loss or damage to the trust property no matter how 
indolent, imprudent, lacking in diligence, negligent  
or wilful he may have been, so long as he has not 
acted dishonestly.’
From a public policy perspective, that view is 
unsatisfactory.43 Indeed, the prevalence of broadly 
drafted trustee exemption clauses in the trust 
industry has caused the perverse situation that  
the very trustees that ought to have higher 
standards apply to their conduct in administering 
trusts are the very persons who insist on the  
lowest standards of care and fullest exemptions.44 
40. Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902, 941 per Sir Christopher Slade. For a subsequent 
interpretation of the objective assessment of reasonableness, see Fattal v Walbrook 
Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2767 (Ch), paras 78–82 per Lewison J; Madoff 
Securities International Ltd v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147, paras 323–26 per Popplewell 
J. On the test for dishonesty, compare Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liquidation) 
v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 All ER 333 and Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley  
[2002] 2 AC 164 
41. Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 421, 253–54 per Millett LJ (with whom Hirst and 
Hutchison JJA agreed) 
42. Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 421, 251 per Millett LJ (with whom Hirst and 
Hutchison JJA agreed)
43. Dal Pont, ‘The Exclusion of Liability for Trustee Fraud’, 6 APLJ 41 (1998)
44. Compare Law Commission, Trustee Exemption Clauses (No.171, 2002), para 3.31; 
Law Commission, Trustee Exemption Clauses (No.301, 2006), para 4.10
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Following extensive consultation and  
reporting by the Law Commission, which  
only produced soft recommendations and a  
‘rule of practice’,45 that position is unlikely to 
change in England and Wales unless a suitable  
case is taken to the UK Supreme Court to test  
the correctness of Armitage v Nurse, key aspects  
of which have been subsequently questioned.46  
It may be that the UK Supreme Court may  
consider that a clause which purports to 
prospectively exempt a trustee from all forms  
of liability for loss or damage caused to a trust  
‘no matter how indolent, imprudent, lacking  
in diligence, negligent or wilful [the trustee]  
may have been, so long as [the trustee] has  
not acted dishonestly’ is unacceptable and  
is not to be borne by the beneficiaries. In the 
interim, English and Welsh trustees are likely  
to insist on broad trustee exemption clauses to 
avoid liability for gross negligence.47 
Guernsey 
Since 19 February 1991, Guernsey has provided 
greater protection to beneficiaries in the offshore 
administration of Guernsey trusts than that 
provided in England and Wales. Specifically, this 
45. Law Commission, Trustee Exemption Clauses (No.301, 2006), paragraphs 7.1–7.2. 
See also STEP, ‘Guidance Notes: STEP Practice Rule to Trustee Exemption Clauses’, 
available at www.step.org/guidance-notes. See Kenny, ‘Conveyancer’s Notebook:  
The Good, the Bad and the Law Commission’ [2007] Conv 103, 103–08
46. E.g. Spread (PC) 46–52 per Lord Clarke (with whom Lord Mance and Sir Robin 
Auld agreed), 129 per Lady Hale; Law Commission, Trustee Exemption Clauses 
(No.171, 2002), paragraph 2.54; Hildyard J, ‘Prudence and Vituperative Epithets’, 
available at www.step.org/prudence-and-vituperative-epithets
47. E.g. Re Clapham’s Estate; Barraclough v Mell [2006] WTLR 203; [2005]  
EWHC B17
was achieved by prohibiting the exemption or 
indemnification of liability for a breach of trust 
arising from the trustee’s ‘own fraud, wilful 
misconduct or gross negligence.’48 For the 
avoidance of doubt, Guernsey trusts law also 
invalidates pro tanto any term of a trust that 
purports to relieve or indemnify a trustee of 
liability for a breach of trustee arising from his  
own fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence.49 
A trustee will be personally liable, irrespective of 
the existence of a trustee exemption clause for  
‘any loss or depreciation in value of the trust 
property resulting from the breach’, as well as  
for ‘any profit which would have accrued to the 
trust had there been no breach’.50 
Liability is, however, appropriately limited where 
there are multiple trustees and only some of the 
trustees have participated in the breach of trust. In 
such cases, the innocent trustee will not be liable 
unless ‘he becomes or ought to have become aware  
of the breach or of the intention of his co-trustee to 
commit the breach’, and ‘he actively conceals the 
breach or intention, or fails within a reasonable time 
to take proper steps to protect or restore the trust 
property or to prevent the breach.’51 A similar 
situation arises where a newly appointed trustee 
discovers past breaches of trust, in which case the 
new trustee ‘shall take all reasonable steps to have the 
breach remedied.’52 




52. Ibid, s39(3) and (6)
The prevalence of broadly drafted trustee exemption clauses in the trust industry  
has caused the perverse situation that the very trustees that ought to have  
higher standards apply to their conduct in administering trusts are the very  
persons who insist on the lowest standards of care and fullest exemptions
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Jersey 
In functionally equivalent terms to Guernsey, 
Jersey has taken a similarly robust position with 
respect to trustee exemption clauses, in providing 
that ‘nothing in the terms of a trust shall relieve, 
release or exonerate a trustee from liability for 
breach of trust arising from the trustee’s own 
fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence.’53 The 
potential liability of a trustee is similarly broad, 
including ‘the loss or depreciation in value of the 
trust property resulting from such breach’ and ‘the 
profit, if any, which would have accrued to the trust 
property if there had been no such breach.’54 
The strictness of the rules on trustee liability  
are moderated by a trustee only being ‘liable for  
a breach of trust committed by the trustee or in 
which the trustee has concurred’ and not being 
liable for a breach of trust by a co-trustee, ‘unless 
the trustee becomes aware or ought to have 
become aware of the commission of such breach or 
of the intention of his or her co-trustee to commit  
a breach of trust… and the trustee actively conceals 
such breach or such intention or fails within a 
reasonable time to take proper steps to protect  
or restore the trust property or prevent such 
breach.’55 As is the case in Guernsey, ‘a trustee  
shall not be liable for a breach of trust committed 
prior to the trustee’s appointment, if such breach 
of trust was committed by some other person’, 
although a new trustee must ‘take all reasonable 
steps to have such breach remedied’.56 
BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY  
AND PROTECTION OF TRUSTEES
It is a widely held view that professional trustees 
and possibly, although it is less likely, well-advised 
lay trustees will draft trustee exemption clauses to  
the fullest possible extent as a matter of course.  
In Australia, one leading trust commentary notes  
it to be ‘a melancholy fact that [trustee exemption] 
clauses are usually insisted on by highly paid 
53. Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, 30(10)
54. Ibid at 30(2)(a) and (b)
55. Ibid at 30(5)(a) and (b)
56. Ibid at 30(4) and (9)
professional trustees (like trustee companies),  
who hope to gain immunity from the consequences 
of departing from their own advertised standards 
of expertise’.57 In England and Wales, a similar, 
seemingly inescapable, melancholy pervades trusts 
discourse. Indeed, one need look no further than 
the leading case of Armitage v Nurse, in which 
Millett LJ said ‘… it must be acknowledged that the 
view is widely held that these [trustee exemption] 
clauses have gone too far, and that the trustees who 
charge for their services and who, as professional 
men, would not dream of excluding liability for 
ordinary professional negligence should not be 
able to rely on a trustee exemption clause 
excluding liability for gross negligence’.58 
Kessler QC said in an earlier edition of his 
popular trust drafting book: ‘The problem with 
exemption clauses, it is considered, is not one of 
trust law but of trust draftsmanship. The solution 
is not law reform, but a drafting solution; to require 
appropriate use of such clauses in trust drafting. A 
strengthening of the rules of professional conduct 
– or to a greater recognition of the implications of 
existing rules – would be the best solution to the 
problem.’59 In the latest edition of that text, Kessler 
QC and Sartin go on to rightly acknowledge that 
they really have no idea whether such an approach 
has been a success or not and that an empirical 
study would be required to provide some 
indication of the measure of success. 
However, the melancholy fact that trustee 
exemption clauses have gone too far in practice  
is not an inescapable reality. It is a matter for  
each jurisdiction to ensure minimal standards  
of care in the administration of trusts by setting 
mandatory rules that reflect the underlying  
public policy imperatives behind competent  
trust administration. To that end, it is far  
better to set the limits up to which a settlor  
can prospectively exempt a trustee from the 
57. Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia, 7th edn (LexisNexis, 2006), paragraphs 1619–20
58. Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241, 256 per Millett LJ (with whom Hirst and 
Hutchison JJA agreed)
59. Kessler QC, Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts, 7th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004). 
See also Kessler QC and Pursall, Drafting Cayman Islands Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006), page 94
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financial consequences of their misconduct, as is 
the case in the Channel Islands.
Furthermore, if it is so widely regarded that 
trustee exemption clauses have gone too far then 
the answer to the ‘problem’ of trustee exemption 
clauses is not optimistic recommendations and 
soft law but statutory reform to define exactly what 
is the minimum standard of care that a trustee is 
required to take in the administration of a trust. 
Such an approach has the benefit of certainty  
and would not require any empirical study to 
determine the measure of its success.60 
Interestingly, the melancholy fact with  
respect to the onshore trust industry is not the 
result of trust draftsmen following precedent  
texts from leading practitioner guides, but from 
the insistence by trustees either acting on advice  
or from an awareness of the lower standard  
of care imposed on them in the general and 
statutory law. 
In the modern trust precedents, we find an 
encouraging shift away from the inclusion of  
broad trustee exemption clauses. Thus, in relation 
to the ‘liability of trustees’, the second edition of 
the STEP Standard Provisions recommends the 
inclusion of the following provision into trust 
instruments: ‘a Trustee shall not be liable for a loss 
60. Kessler QC and Leon Sartin, Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts: A Modern 
Approach (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), page 108
to the trust fund unless that loss was caused by  
his own actual fraud or negligence’.61 The detailed 
guidance to that provision confirms the linking of 
that exemption with the default standard of care in 
trust administration, in providing that ‘trustees are 
not liable for breach of trust when they have acted 
honestly and with reasonable care.’62 
Another welcome sign that STEP has attempted 
to grapple with the difficult public policy issue over 
higher standards applying to professional trustees 
is found in the delineation between the exemptions 
applicable to different kinds of trustees. Thus, in  
the STEP Standard Provisions, STEP recommends 
the inclusion of a further provision as follows:
 ‘12.2 A Trustee shall not be liable for a loss to the Trust 
Fund unless that loss or damage was caused by his 
own actual fraud, provided that:
 12.2.1 the Trustee acts as a lay trustee…; and
 12.2.2 there is another Trustee who does not act as  
a lay Trustee.’
Again, the ‘detailed guidance’ to that draft clause 
relevantly provides that ‘this clause… relieves  
a lay Trustee, even if negligent, unless guilty of  
fraud and as long as there is a professional 
Trustee… Thus a lay Trustee may, if they choose, 
broadly leave the Trust administration to a 
professional co-Trustee.’63 
The failure to include such a clause may lead to 
serious financial exposure for a lay trustee who 
entrusts the administration to another trustee. But 
it is not all lay-trustee-sided, as there is a safeguard 
in the requirement for there to be at least one other 
trustee, who is not a lay trustee (i.e. a professional 
trustee). The potential uncertainty in delineating 
between lay and professional trustees is resolved 
by reference to the relevant trust legislation.64 
Thus, ‘a person acts as a lay trustee if he – (a) is  
not a trust corporation, and (b) does not act in  
a professional capacity’.65 
61. STEP Standard Provisions, 2nd edn, clause 4, available at www.step.org/ 
step-standard-provisions
62. Ibid at 11
63. Ibid at 11
64. Ibid at 4 (clause 12.2.1 further provides that a ‘lay trustee’ falls ‘within the meaning 
of s28 Trustee Act 2000’)
65. TA 2000, s28(6)
The answer to the ‘problem’ of trustee 
exemption clauses is not optimistic 
recommendations and soft law but 
statutory reform to define exactly 
what is the minimum standard of care 
that a trustee is required to take in the 
administration of a trust 
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For the purposes of the TA 2000, ‘trust 
corporation’ has the same meaning as that 
provided for in the Trustee Act 1925.66 As such, 
‘“Trust corporation” means the Public Trustee  
or a corporation either appointed by the court  
in any particular case to be a trustee, or entitled  
by rules made under subsection (3) of section four 
of the Public Trustee Act 1906, to act as custodian 
trustee…’ and, therefore has a much narrower 
meaning than what might be thought is meant  
by a ‘trust corporation’. Thus, the second limb  
(i.e. a trustee acting in a professional capacity) is 
more likely to apply in most cases. To alleviate the 
shortcomings of allowing professional trustees to 
be exempted for liability for a breach of trust, the 
Law Commission’s rule of best practice requires 
‘professional trustees’ (i.e. trustees who receive 
remuneration for administering a trust) to bring 
any clause purporting to limit liability to the 
attention of the settlor.67 
Elsewhere, Kessler QC has, with Sartin, 
recommended against the drafting of broad 
exemption clauses and advised that a clause be 
included in trust instruments in the same terms  
as he proposes in the STEP Standard Provisions.68  
In doing so, they hope that ‘there is still a 
marketplace in which some firms will undertake 
the duties of trustee on terms that they undertake 
to use reasonable care and accept responsibility  
if they fail to do so.’69 
Further, they suggest that the adoption of 
narrow trustee exemption clauses may confer a 
competitive advantage over other professional 
trustees that routinely insist on exempting 
themselves for negligent trust administration.70 
Their plea is overly optimistic, as it is unlikely  
66. TA 2000, s39(1)
67. Law Commission, Trustee Exemption Clauses (No.301, 30 July 2006), paragraph 
7.1; STEP, Guidance Notes: STEP Practice Rule to Trustee Exemption Clauses, 
available at www.step.org/sites/default/files/Comms/STEPGuidanceNotes.pdf. See 
also Kessler QC and Sartin, Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts: A Modern Approach  
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), pages 102–3
68. Kessler QC and Sartin, Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts: A Modern Approach 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), 109 (‘a Trustee shall not be liable for a loss to the Trust Fund 
unless that loss was caused by his own actual fraud or negligence’)
69. Ibid at 106
70. Ibid
that such trustees would advertise their services in 
this way. A better approach would be to state the 
minimum standards of care that apply to trustees 
as a matter of law irrespective of trust drafting. 
This would not expose trustees unduly as there 
remain internal mechanisms in trusts law that 
protect diligent trustees from liability, the main 
three of which are considered below.
Advice 
First, trustees can and ought to seek advice in 
relation to a broad range of administrative and 
dispositive matters in order to discharge their  
duty of care. To make that clear, a provision may  
be drafted into a trust in the terms provided for in 
the STEP Standard Provisions, that:71 
 ‘A Trustee shall not be liable for acting in accordance 
with the advice of counsel, of at least five years’ 
standing, with respect to the Trust. The Trustees may 
in particular conduct legal proceedings in accordance 
with such advice without obtaining a court order. A 
Trustee may recover from the Trust Fund any expenses 
where he has acted in accordance with such advice.’
However, according to the STEP Standard 
Provisions, the exoneration of trustees by  
means of obtaining advice does not apply in certain, 
entirely sensible circumstances, including where 
the trustee knows or suspects that counsel’s advice 
was incomplete, court proceedings are pending on 
the matter or where the trustee either has a personal 
interest in, or has committed a breach of trust 
relating to, the subject matter of the advice.72 
A somewhat odd aspect of the UK Supreme 
Court’s decision in Futter v HMRC; Pitt v HMRC 
was that the court upheld the view that ‘if the 
trustee has in accordance with his duty identified 
the relevant considerations and used all proper care 
and diligence in obtaining the relevant information 
and advice relating to those considerations, the 
trustee can be in no breach of duty and its decision 
cannot be impugned merely because in fact that 
information turns out to be partial or incorrect’ as  
71. STEP Standard Provisions, 2nd edn, clause 12.3
72. STEP Standard Provisions, 2nd edn, clause 12.4 and 11
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a correct statement of the law and that ‘apart from 
exceptional circumstances… only breach of fiduciary 
duty justifies judicial intervention.’73 Given that 
represents a modern view, it is worthwhile 
addressing the point in trust drafting, as it remains 
possible for a trustee to be liable for a breach of trust 
despite obtaining professional advice.74 
Beneficiaries 
Second, trustees may seek the concurrence of 
beneficiaries in order to relieve or indemnify 
themselves from liability for a breach of trust.75  
In some cases, such as in trusts of land to which  
the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees 
Act 1996 (TLATA) applies, a statutory duty may  
be imposed on trustees to consult the beneficiaries 
with respect to ‘the exercise of any function 
relating to the land subject to the trust’ and to  
‘give effect to the wishes of those beneficiaries’ 
accordingly.76 Like the duty of care in the TA 2000, 
the duty to consult and obey the wishes of the 
beneficiaries in the TLATA is not mandatory,  
but excludable by the terms of the trust.77 
The trustee’s duty to consult beneficiaries is 
somewhat vague and empty in any event – it is also 
potentially problematic in that it may place the 
trustee in a difficult position where the particular 
duty to consult and obey the beneficiaries conflicts 
with the general duty to perform the trust.78 In such 
cases, the general duty to perform the trust ought to 
prevail.79 For these reasons, any duty to consult 
beneficiaries is expressly excluded by the trust 
instrument in favour of an ‘absolute discretion 
clause’.80 Here, the concern is not with a general 
73. Pitt v HMRC; Futter v Futter [2013] 2 AC 108, 131, 139–141 per Lord Walker, 
approving Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] Ch 409, 23 per Lightman J  
and 178 and Pitt v Holt; Futter v Futter (2012) Ch 132, 178 per Lloyd LJ
74. Pitt v HMRC; Futter v Futter [2013] 2 AC 108, 140 per Lord Walker. See also Stott 
v Milne (1884) 25 Ch D 710, 714 per Lord Selborne LC, approved in Re Beddoe [1893] 
1 Ch 547, 558 per Lindley LJ; Re Dive [1909] 1 Ch 328, 342 per Warrington J 
75. Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s40; Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, s30(6) and (7)
76. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (UK), s11(1)
77. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (UK), s11(2), (3) and (4)
78. E.g. a trustee of land may owe a duty to consult with, and obey the wishes of, the 
life tenants, but the wishes of the life tenants may commonly conflict with those of the 
remainderman, who may not yet be born or cannot be consulted for some other reason
79. E.g. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (UK), s11(1)(b)
80. STEP Standard Provisions, 2nd edn, clause 19. See also Kessler QC and Sartin, 
Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts, 11th edn (2012), 142
duty to consult beneficiaries, which does not arise 
except from the terms of the trust or some statutory 
provision in any event,81 but with the ability of the 
trustee to minimise the risks associated with trust 
administration by avoiding liability and securing 
indemnification by means of such consultation. 
As such, trustees may be able to avoid liability  
for a breach of trust where the trustee has sought 
and obtained the concurrence of the beneficiary as 
to the proposed course of action, irrespective of 
whether the beneficiary is actually aware that the 
relevant conduct would constitute a breach of 
trust.82 Of course, proper disclosure must be made 
by a trustee and fully informed consent must be 
obtained from the beneficiaries. Once the trustee 
has done so, it will be difficult for a beneficiary to 
make a successful claim for personal liability for 
breach of trust arising out of a course of action in 
which the beneficiary consented, with virtually 
identical provisions in England and Wales, 
Guernsey and Jersey codifying this position.83 
Court
Third, trustees are in the enviable position of  
being able to approach the court for advice and 
directions as to how to perform their duties and 
will obtain a prospective indemnity if they have 
made full disclosure of all material matters 
pertaining to that advice and act accordingly.84 
That is a better working model for trust 
administration, as well as the coherent operation 
of trust law, than the inclusion of broadly drafted 
trustee exemption clauses in trust instruments. 
In addition to the ability of trustees to be able  
to approach the court for advice and directions 
concerning any matter of doubt arising in the 
administration of the trust, there is also a statutory 
power for the court to relieve a trustee from 
81. X v A [2000] 1 All ER 490, 496 per Arden J
82. Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts, Younghusband v Coutts & Co [1961] 3 All ER 713, 
729–30 per Wilberforce J
83. Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s56; Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, s46; Trustee Act 1925 
(UK), s 62(1)
84. In England and Wales, see Administration of Justice Act 1985, s48; Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998, Part 64, Practice Direction 64A and 64B. In Guernsey,  
see Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, sections 68 and 69. In Jersey, see Trusts (Jersey)  
Law 1984, s51
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personal liability for a breach of trust where the 
trustee has acted honestly and reasonably, and 
ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and 
for omitting to obtain the directions of the court.85
Plainly, it is more desirable for trustees to seek 
advice and directions from the court before 
undertaking any legally uncertain course of conduct 
in the administration of a trust – indeed, the 
statutory provision conferring power to relieve 
trustees from personal liability refers not only to a 
trustee being excused from the breach of trust, but 
also to failing to obtain directions from the court. 
Given the bias toward proactivity by trustees, and 
prospective directions being given by the court for 
trustees to obtain indemnification, the statutory 
power is often seen by trust practitioners as a  
‘false friend’ of trustees that cannot be relied  
upon to justify past conduct ex post facto, but  
only as a defence of last resort against allegations  
of maladministration.86 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions drawn in this article are threefold. 
First, the peculiar obligation to act en bon père de 
famille in Guernsey trust law has effectively been 
translated in the Spread litigation and equated with 
the English and Welsh, and Jersey duties of care. 
Although that approach fails to give any weight to 
Guernsey legal heritage, it does have the benefit  
of certainty and cohesion. One key difference, 
however, is that the Guernsey and Jersey trusts  
laws adopt the duty of care as mandatory rules and 
prohibit the exemption of a trustee’s liability for 
fraud, wilful default or gross negligence, rather than 
leaving those matters (save fraud) as matters of trust 
drafting, which remains the case in English and 
Welsh law. The clear statutory position taken in the 
85. Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s55; Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, s45; Trustee Act 1925 
(UK), s61
86. See Waterworth, A Practitioner’s Guide to Drafting Trusts, 2nd edn (2007), 115. 
See also, Thurston, A Practitioner’s Guide to Trusts, 9th edn (2011), 151 (questioning 
‘what is reasonable conduct in this context?’); Kessler QC and Sartin, Drafting Trusts 
and Will Trusts, 11th edn (2012), 108–09 (recommending additional drafting in the trust 
instrument to properly protect trustees from personal liability)
Channel Islands is to be preferred, as it promotes 
prudent trust administration. 
Second, leading precedent texts and drafting 
manuals attempt to fill gaps left in onshore trust 
administration by recommending against the 
inclusion of broad trustee exemption clauses,  
and attempt to approximate onshore trust 
administration with the minimum standard 
expected of offshore trustees as a matter of law. 
Again, the better approach would be for a clear 
legislative provision to provide for the minimum 
standards that apply to trust administration 
irrespective of trust drafting. 
Third, there is no need for broad exemptions  
of liability for trustees who conduct themselves  
with reasonable diligence, as existing mechanisms 
within trusts law serve to protect prudent trustees, 
especially by indemnifying trustees by the taking of 
advice, concurrence with beneficiaries and directions 
from the court. Aside from the duty of care, which 
itself can be excluded by the terms of a trust, the 
mandatory rules of English and Welsh trust law are 
too trustee-biased when compared to Guernsey and 
Jersey, both of which have struck a more appropriate 
balance between beneficiaries and trustees and 
furthered the public policy incentive of promoting 
prudent trust administration. 
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